THE PRIVACY MERCHANTS: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Amitai Etzioni
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Rights have been long understood, first and foremost, as protection of the private from the public,
the individual from the State. True, we also recognize positive rights (such as socioeconomic
rights) and the government’s duty to protect citizens from violations of rights by other actors besides
the State. However, when violations of privacy
are discussed, the first violator that typically comes
1
to mind is “Big Brother”—that is, the State.
This Article focuses on the growing threat to privacy from private actors, specifically profit-making
corporations. It briefly outlines a range of options aimed at protecting individual privacy against
encroachment by private actors, and it evaluates them within the prevailing normative, legal, and
political context in the United States.

I. CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE, TRACKING, DATA MINING, AND
PROFILING
Most informed citizens probably know by now that corporations
collect information about them, but they may well be unaware of the
extent and scope of the invasions of privacy that are now widespread.
Many may be aware of tracking tools referred to as “cookies.” Cookies are installed on one’s computer by visited Web sites. They are
used to identify the person and to remember his or her preferences.
Some people have learned to protect themselves from such tracking
by employing software that allows one to clear cookies from one’s
computer. However, corporations have recently begun to install “supercookies” that are very difficult to detect and, if removed, secretly
2
reinstall themselves. As one report concluded: “This means that
privacy-sensitive consumers who ‘toss’ their HTTP cookies to prevent
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See, e.g., SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE 2
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See Julia Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy ‘Supercookies,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2011,
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(citing cookies used through Flash software as an example of this practice).
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tracking or remain anonymous are still being uniquely identified on3
line by advertising companies.”
Major cell phone and mobile technology companies offer services
that allow lovers, ex-spouses, lawyers, or anyone else to find out where
a person is—and track their movements—by using the GPS capabili4
ties of their cell phones. A German politician who inquired about
location storage information discovered that over a six-month period,
5
his longitude and latitude had been recorded over 35,000 times.
There are two kinds of corporations that keep track of what Internet users buy, read, visit, and drink, and who they call, e-mail, date,
and much else. Some merely track users’ activity on their sites as part
of their regular business; recording purchases and viewed products
helps them increase sales. This is true for nearly every major online
retailer. Other corporations make shadowing Internet users—and
keeping very detailed dossiers on them—their main line of business.
One can call these the “Privacy Merchants.” They sell information to
whoever pays the required price. In 2005, one such company—
6
Choicepoint—had records on over 220 million people. Professor
Christopher Slobogin notes that the amount of information culled by
corporate data miners
can provide the inquirer with a wide array of data about any of us, including basic demographic information, income, net worth, real property
holdings, social security number, current and previous addresses, phone
numbers and fax numbers, names of neighbors, driver records, license
plate and VIN numbers, bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment,
business and criminal records, bank account balances and activity, stock
7
purchases, and credit card activity.

In 2009, a law professor at Fordham University gained minor notoriety when he assigned his class to create a dossier on Justice Antonin
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See Justin Scheck, Stalkers Exploit Cellphone GPS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383522318244234.html
(reporting how GPS systems “have unexpectedly made it easier for abusers to track their
victims”).
Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move, and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2011, at A1 (noting that Deutsche Telekom “traced him from a train on the way to Erlangen at the start through to that last night, when he was home in Berlin”).
They’re Watching You, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005 (book review), http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/05_04/b3917056_mz005.htm.
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 320 (2008) (describing how the government “routinely makes use” of these
“commercial data brokers”).
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Scalia using only the information they could find online—resulting in
a fifteen-page file “that included the justice’s home address and
home phone number, his wife’s personal e-mail address and the TV
8
shows and food he prefers.” Some Privacy Merchants even keep dossiers on a person’s marital status and political leanings, as well as interests in topics including religion, the Bible, gambling, and adult en9
tertainment.
Although several data-mining companies allow individuals to opt
out of their databases, each separate company must be contacted individually, and even then information may still linger in some search
results or Web sites. Google, for example, generally does not remove
search results if the information contained is truthful and not illeg10
al.
Privacy Merchants are limited by laws Congress (and states) have
enacted that carve out subsets of data that they cannot freely trade in,
especially medical and financial records. So far though, very little attention has been paid to the fact that information is fungible.
Through a process that might be called “privacy violating triangulation” (“PVT”), one can readily derive much about a person’s medical,
financial, or other protected private side by using “innocent facts” not
privileged by law. A piece of seemingly benign information—for instance, the number of days a person failed to show up for work, or if
the person made special purchases, such as a wig—suggests volumes
about one’s medical condition. By building a portfolio of many such
apparently innocuous facts, one could infer a great deal, effectively
violating the realm of privacy surrounding individuals’ most sensitive
information. Thus, a study of Facebook shows “how the on-line social
network data could be used to predict some individual private trait
that a user is not willing to disclose (e.g. political or religious affilia11
tion).” This will be discussed in further detail below.
Some individuals may think that they can protect themselves from
tracking and dossiers by using pseudonyms and multiple “mailboxes.”
8
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Noam Cohen, Law Students Teach Scalia About Privacy and the Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2009, at B3.
See Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users By Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575560243259416072.html
(profiling the online tracking company RapLeaf, Inc.).
See Riva Richmond, How to Fix (Or Kill) Web Data About You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at
B6 (explaining Google’s policy for removing information from its search engines).
Jack Lindamood et al., Inferring Private Information Using Social Network Data, Presentation at the 18th International World Wide Web Conference, Madrid (Apr. 20–24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.utdallas.edu/~muratk/publications/www09pp242lindamood.pdf.
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However, some companies have developed software to match pseudonyms used on message boards and blogs with real names and per12
sonal e-mail addresses. The subjects of this tracking, who are unaware that their anonymity has been stripped, include people who use
13
online pseudonyms to discuss sensitive topics like mental illness. As
Eli Pariser reports, “[s]earch for a word like ‘depression’ on Dictionary.com, and the site installs up to 223 tracking cookies and beacons
on your computer so that other Web sites can target you with antide14
pressants.” It should be noted that the privacy of medical records is
protected by law, but “visits” to medical Web sites or chat groups are
not.
Many companies claim that they do not collect names or that they
disassociate names from dossiers. However, some companies keep a
database of names on file. One such company, RapLeaf, states that it
does not share its subjects’ names with advertisers, but an investigation found that it does link those names to “extraordinarily intimate
databases . . . by tapping voter-registration files, shopping histories,
15
social-networking activities and real estate records . . . .”
And although the company indeed refrains from specifically sharing names
with its clients, it did share personally identifiable information with
them, such as unique Facebook account numbers that can be traced
16
back to the account holder’s name.
Privacy advocates have sharply objected to the government’s use
of deep packet inspection (“DPI”)—a powerful tool used to analyze
the contents of communications transmitted over the Internet—in
large part because it is much more intrusive than merely tracking
who is communicating with whom. (The difference is akin to reading
letters versus examining the outside of an envelope to see who sent
the letter and to whom it is addressed.) Now private companies are
offering to perform DPI for Internet Service Providers to facilitate
17
targeted advertising.
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Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, ‘Scrapers’ Dig Deep for Data on Web, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
2010, at A1 (describing software that “matches people’s real names to the pseudonyms
they use on blogs, Twitter, and other social networks”).
See id. (describing a forum in which “people exchange highly personal stories about their
emotional disorders, ranging from bipolar disease to a desire to cut themselves”).
Eli Pariser, What the Internet Knows About You, CNN (May 22, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-22/opinion/pariser.filter.bubble.
Steel, supra note 9.
Id.
Steve Stecklow & Paul Sonne, Shunned Profiling Method on the Verge of Comeback, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2010, at A1.
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In 2010, Facebook became the most-visited Web site in the United
18
19
States, nearing 700 million users in June 2011. Facebook users put
great amounts of personal information on their individual profiles,
including their religious and political views, educational and professional background, and interests, as well as photos and videos of
themselves. Most importantly, unlike most other Web sites where individuals employ usernames or pseudonyms, Facebook is designed
for people to use their real names. This makes it vastly more valuable
to data miners who seek to gather personally identifiable information
in order to assemble dossiers on the individuals. Furthermore, each
individual’s profile is linked to the profiles of his or her “friends,”
who may have different privacy settings allowing for broader access to
shared data, such as photographs or group membership, than the individual chooses to exhibit on his or her own profile.
Facebook provides customizable privacy tools and some privacy
protection, but it has faced consistent criticism that those protections
20
are difficult to manipulate. As Facebook has introduced third-party
applications (such as games) to its site, it has faced mounting difficulties in keeping its end of the bargain.
In a July 2010 letter to Representative John Conyers of the U.S.
House Judiciary Committee, a Facebook official stated that
the question posed in your letter asks whether Facebook shares users’
personal information with third parties without the knowledge of users
. . . . The answer is simple and straightforward: we do not. We have designed our system and policies so that user information is never shared
21
without our users’ knowledge.

It was a few months later, in October 2010, that the Wall Street Journal
22
broke the story of extensive user privacy breaches by Facebook. It
discovered that popular Facebook applications were “providing access
to people’s names and, in some cases, their friends’ names” to Inter23
net tracking companies. According to the Journal, the breach af18
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Jessica Guynn, T. Rowe Price Invests in Facebook, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/04/t-rowe-price-invests-in-facebook.
html.
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Facebook: 700,000,000, BUS. INSIDER (May 31, 2011, 3:08 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-700-million-2011-5.
Facebook Faces Criticism on Privacy Change, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2009, 10:09 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/8405334.stm.
Juliana Gruenwald, Facebook Defends Privacy Policies, NAT. J. SUBSCRIBER (July 27, 2010),
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/07/facebook-defends-privacy-polic.php
(internal quotation marks omitted).
See Emily Steel & Geoffrey Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, at
A1(investigating Facebook apps and their unauthorized transfer of private user data).
Id.
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fected “tens of millions” of users—including those who were vigilant
in setting their privacy protections—and was in violation of Face24
book’s stated policies. In the same month, the New York Times reported on two studies that found that “in certain circumstances, advertisers—or snoops posing as advertisers [on Facebook]—may be
able to learn sensitive profile information, like a person’s sexual
orientation or religion, even if the person is sharing that information
25
only with a small circle of friends.”
In addition, the nearly ubiquitous Facebook “Like” button and
Twitter “Tweet” button on Web sites “notify Facebook and Twitter
that a person visited those sites even when users don’t click on the
26
buttons.” These widgets have been added to millions of Web pages
and they appear on more than one-third of the world’s top 1000 Web
sites—allowing sites with those widgets to track specific Facebook us27
ers. The tracking (which is used for targeted advertising) continues
until the user specifically logs out of his or her account, even if the
28
user turns off the computer.
One may argue that the private sector merely uses this information for commercial purposes, while the government may use it to jail
people, suppress free speech, and otherwise violate their rights.
However, one must note that the violation of privacy by private agents
has some similar effects to violations committed by government
agents—effects that lead to discrimination and “chilling” of expression and dissent. Thus, when gay people who seek to keep their sexual orientation private are “outed” by the media, or banks call in
loans of those they find out have cancer, or employers refuse to hire
people because they learn about their political or religious views, privacy is violated in a manner about as consequential as if the same violations had been carried out by a government agency.
II. PRIVACY MERCHANTS IN THE SERVICE OF BIG BROTHER
Even if one disregards the facts already cited, which show that
corporate violations of privacy are far-reaching and chilling, one must
note that the information corporations amass is available to the government. Laws may prevent the government from ordering a private
24
25
26
27
28

See id. (“Facebook prohibits app makers from transferring data about users to outside advertising and data companies, even if a user agrees”).
Miguel Helft, Marketers Can Glean Private Data on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at B1.
Amir Efrati, ‘Like’ Button Follows Web Users, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2011, at B1.
See id. (evaluating a study by former Google engineer, Brian Kennish, of the 1000 most
popular Web sites).
See id. at B2 (concluding that widgets are a powerful way to track Internet users).
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company to conduct surveillance on innocent citizens not suspected
of anything or from generating dossiers that the government itself is
banned from generating (in other words, when corporations act as
government agents, they may be subject to the same or similar limitations by which the government must abide). However, the government can and does use data already amassed by Privacy Merchants for
their own sake. Nor do prevailing laws prevent private corporations
from analyzing online activity with an eye towards the government’s
needs and shaping their privacy-violating data in ways to make them
more attractive to government purchasers of their services. Indeed,
because the government is such a large and reliable client, corporate
databanks have a strong financial interest in anticipating its needs.
The thesis that what is private does not stay private is far from hypothetical. As Chris Hoofnagle notes, even though Congress limited
the executive branch’s amassing of personal information in the 1974
Privacy Act, “those protections have failed to meet Congress’ [sic] intent because the private sector has done what the government has
29
been prohibited from doing.”
According to Daniel Solove, “for quite some time, the government
has been increasingly contracting with businesses to acquire databases of personal information. Database firms are willing to supply the
30
information and the government is willing to pay for it.” Solove
points out that the government can “find out details about people’s
race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchasing habits from the database companies that keep extensive personal
31
information on millions of Americans.”
Hoofnagle similarly warns that “[p]rivate sector commercial data
brokers have built massive data centers with personal information
32
custom-tailored to law enforcement agents.” ChoicePoint, a major
Privacy Merchant, has at least thirty-five contracts with government
agencies, including the Department of Justice (through which it provides its databases to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”)), as
well as the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), the Internal

29
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Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data
Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
595, 636 (2004).
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 169 (2004).
Id. at 167.
Hoofnagle, supra note 29, at 636–37.
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Revenue Service (“IRS”), and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immi33
gration Services.
Another corporate data miner, Florida-based SeisInt, ran a massive database called MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange) in a joint effort among several U.S. states to coordi34
nate counterterrorism efforts. The federal government paid $12
million to support the program, which SeisInt developed with extensive amounts of data, including individuals’ “criminal histories, photographs, property ownership, SSNs, addresses, bankruptcies, family
35
members, and credit information.” Even before the 9/11 attacks,
the U.S. Marshals Service alone performed up to 40,000 searches
36
every month using private databanks. The exact number of contracts the government has made with corporate data miners is un37
known because many of the contracts are classified. However, one
2006 government study found that at least fifty-two federal agencies
had launched—or were planning to launch at the time of the study—
at least 199 data mining projects that rely on the services and tech38
nology of commercial databanks.
Other government tracking and surveillance efforts have relied on
private corporations. In 2006, it was disclosed that three major telecommunications providers, AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth, had cooperated with the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to provide it with
the phone call records of “tens of millions of Americans”—a program
which, according to one source, was “the largest database ever assem39
bled in the world.” The companies, which agreed to work with the
NSA, provide phone service to over 200 million Americans, leading
the program significantly closer to its ultimate goal: creating a data-
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Jay Stanley, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: How the American Government Is Conscripting
Businesses and Individuals in the Construction of a Surveillance Society, 26 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION (2004), http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf (discussing government customers’ large contracts with data companies).
SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 170.
Id.
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 320 (highlighting the variety of data available in these banks
including demographic information, net worth, employment and criminal records, and
credit card activity).
Arshad Mohammed & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Mining, WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/14/AR2006061402063.html (“It is difficult to pinpoint the
number of such contracts because many of them are classified . . . .”).
See id.
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11,
2006, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10nsa_x.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
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base of every phone call made within the United States. Other government projects relying on private sources include efforts by Homeland Security to secure air travel and the nation’s borders and a
Pentagon program which collects data on teenagers to better target
41
military recruitment efforts.
Moreover, the trend is to extend this use, as evidenced by a 2011
FBI manual that enables agents to search for private citizens in com42
mercial databases without prior authorization or even notification.
In 2011, Google revealed that the U.S. government made the most
requests for Internet users’ private data in 2010, with Google comply43
ing with 94% of those orders.
One may well hold that some of the usages of private databanks by
the government serve legitimate purposes, even if they are loaded
with extensive dossiers on most adult Americans, rather than those
for which there is some evidence or reason to suspect that they are
violating the law. However, one must still note that from here on,
whether such databanks are in the FBI headquarters or in some corporate office matters little. At most, they are just a click—and a payment—away.
The next segment of this Article outlines differing approaches to
the protection of privacy in the new world in which the traditional
distinction between public and private realms (on which many normative and legal conceptions build, in particular those that concern
privacy) are much less important and are becoming still less significant. The new amalgamated social world calls for cross-realm or holistic modes of deliberations and policy-making.
III. THE MAIN ALTERNATIVES
The following deliberations draw on my sociological training and
normative considerations and not on any legal preparation. I merely
chart the “big picture” because—as will become clear shortly—most,
if not all, of the alternatives face major hurdles. It therefore seems
premature to spell out any of the alternative approaches before strategies and political forces are developed that will make it possible to
40
41
42

43

See id.
Mohammed & Goo, supra note 37 (discussing the increase in federal government spending for personal data within the private sector).
Charlie Savage, FBI Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at
A1 (“The new rules add to several measures taken over the past decade to give agents
more latitude . . . .”).
Transparency Report, GOOGLE (Jan. 2012) http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
governmentrequests/userdata/?p=2010-12.
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overcome these hurdles. The alternatives are evaluated, not on the
basis of what would best protect privacy from Privacy Merchants, but
on which measures might be taken in the prevailing context in the
United States.
A. Change the Norm: A World Without Privacy?
One major response to Privacy Merchants’ expanding reach has
been well encapsulated by the CEO of Sun Microsystems, Scott
44
McNealy, who stated: “You have zero privacy . . . . Get over it.” Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, argues that social norms under45
girding privacy law are obsolete. That is, instead of finding new ways
to protect individuals from corporations, individuals should learn to
accept changed—in effect, much lower—levels of privacy. He elaborated: “People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more
people . . . . That social norm is just something that has evolved over
46
time.” Zuckerberg continued: “We view it as our role in the system
to constantly be innovating and be updating what our system is to re47
flect what the current social norms are.” He thus implies that the
Privacy Merchants are not undermining the norm but merely accommodating their wares to already-in-place changes in norms.
As I see it, it is true that the privacy norms are eroding due to factors other than the corporate drive to use private information for
profit-making, evidenced by people going on talk shows to reveal
much about themselves, a form of exhibitionism. However, there can
be little doubt that corporations, especially the new social media, led
by Facebook, are aiding and abetting and seeking to legitimize the
erosion of privacy.
The Wall Street Journal editorial page, which reflects that publication’s philosophy, argues that the change in norms indicates that the
introduction of new laws or regulations to better protect privacy is

44
45

46
47

Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy:
‘Get Over It,’ WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.
See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan.
10, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebookprivacy (“The rise of social networking online means that people no longer have an expectation of privacy, according to Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg.”).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ian Paul, Facebook CEO Challenges the Social Norm of Privacy, PCWORLD (Jan. 11, 2010, 10:03
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/186584/facebook_ceo_challenges_the_social_
norm_of_privacy.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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48

not called for. L. Gordon Crovitz pointed out that, as of March
2011, more than half of Americans over age twelve have Facebook ac49
counts. He proceeded to ask: “If most Americans are happy to have
Facebook accounts, knowingly trading personal information for other
benefits, why is Washington so focused on new privacy laws? There is
50
little evidence that people want new rules.”
Furthermore, Crovitz argues, consumers value the benefits of information gathering, including better-targeted ads, specific recommendations for customers, and huge troves of data for research (such
as in Google Flu Trends, which tracks search terms about illnesses to
assist epidemiologists). “People are increasingly at ease with sharing
51
personal data in exchange for other benefits,” he argues.
Some public opinion polls, including recent ones, show that the
American people care a great deal about their privacy. Others show
that various segments of the public vary in the way they feel about this
right. For example, according to a 2009 survey, 73% to 86% of Americans object to the tracking methods used to personalize their adver52
tisements.
Furthermore, the study found that 82% of young
people—who are generally believed to be apathetic about privacy—
had at some point refused to provide information to a company be53
cause it was too personal. Eighty-six percent of Americans—84%
among respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four—felt that their
permission should be sought before pictures of them were posted on54
line.
Other data reveal a more varied picture. In a 1995 survey, Alan
55
Westin divided the public into three “camps” over privacy concerns.
About 25% of respondents were “Privacy Fundamentalists,” who value
privacy especially highly; 55% were “Privacy Pragmatists,” who adjust

48
49
50
51
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L. Gordon Crovitz, The 0.00002% Privacy Solution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2011, at A15
(“There is little evidence that people want new rules.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It, U.
PA. SCHOLARLYCOMMONS, at 14–15 (Sept. 1, 2009), http://repository.upenn.edu/
asc_papers/137.
Chris J. Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to
Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 10 (Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864.
Id.
Alan Westin, “Whatever Works:” The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and SelfRegulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, in NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY AND
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE ch. 1, § F, at 52–53 (1997), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm#1F.
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their expectations based on the relative value of information types
and trust in specific companies; and 20% were “Privacy Unconcerned,” who have no problem with giving out personal informa56
tion.
A 2002 study found that while 70% of consumers were concerned
about their privacy, 82% were willing to give out personal information in exchange for the chance to win a hundred dollars in a sweeps57
takes. The rise in popularity of location-tracking social networking
sites such as Foursquare, Facebook Places, and Gowalla, which offer
discounts to users who log visits to various businesses and restaurants,
suggests that people are indeed willing to trade information once
considered private (their locations and consumption habits) for certain benefits. According to one survey, the coupon reward systems on
58
these sites were the main incentive for users to join.
One must, though, take into account that it is very likely that
those who have relatively little concern about privacy are unaware
that their less sensitive information can be used for PVT, and that
privacy is a right, not subject to majority rule. Even if only a minority
cherishes it, it is still a birthright of all Americans.
B. The Self-Regulation Option
The prevailing system in the United States—and the de facto prevailing system in the Eurpoean Union—relies to a significant extent
on self-regulation and individual choice, that is, the assumption that
consumers will choose the services and products of those corporations that protect privacy at the level the consumers seek and that users can set their privacy controls to the level they prefer. And that, as
a result, corporations that provide less privacy protection than the
public seeks will lose business and be incentivized to enhance their
privacy protection. Additionally, some scholars have argued that
marketing in this vein is protected as free speech under the First
59
Amendment, an argument not addressed in this Article.
These
56
57
58

59

Id.
Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: Everybody Talks About Online Privacy, but Few Do Anything
About It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at C6.
Matt Carmichael, What Consumers Want from Brands Online, ADVERTISING AGE (Feb. 27,
2011), http://adage.com/article/digital/consumers-seek-brand-discounts-facebookpreferred-platform/149095 (discussing coupons as the “main driver listed for users of location-based check-in services”).
For further discussion, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461 (2000), and also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000).
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ideas are founded on the standard libertarian argument, as noted by
Susanna Kim Ripken: “Respect for individual autonomy, responsibility, and decision-making is deeply entrenched in our culture and law.
We believe that people can order their own economic affairs and,
given sufficient information, can make their own personal assess60
ments of the risks and benefits of transactions.”
None of these assumptions withstand sociological scrutiny. The thesis
that consumers are rational actors who make decisions in their best
interests, in line with their personal preferences and available information, has been disproven beyond reasonable doubt by the studies
61
of behavioral economists. For this very reason, transparency does
not work. That is, the suggestion that if corporations simply declare
what their privacy standards are, consumers could choose those that
suit them, is erroneous if not misleading. The statements are written
in legalese, in terms few can penetrate; the privacy settings provided
are complex, cumbersome, and frequently revised—after the users
have posted information on the site that they cannot erase.
Furthermore, without regulation, there is no assurance that corporations will adhere to their privacy declarations, or at least to their
62
implied promise. This does not refer necessarily to outright false
statements, but to carefully crafted yet misleading commitments to
privacy that end up entrapping the consumer. For instance, after
public outcry over the iPhone’s hidden location tracking, Apple released a statement denying that they tracked users’ locations; rather,
they maintained “a database of WiFi hot spots and cell phone towers
63
around your current location . . . .” As Mark Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) pointed out, this database is precisely how the company tracks locations, even if it is not
64
tracking the device itself. A study by DoubleVerify surveyed five billion advertisements and found that an icon explaining the privacy
policy was clicked on only 0.002% of the time—and even then, after
60

61
62

63
64

Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 195–96 (2006) (footnote omitted).
For further discussion on this subject, see Dan Ariely, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 243 (2008).
Chris Hoofnagle, Can Privacy Self-Regulation Work for Consumers?, TECH. ACADS. POL’Y (Jan.
26, 2011), http://www.techpolicy.com/CanPrivacySelf-RegulationWork-Hoofnagle.aspx
(providing examples of organizations that failed to abide by their own privacy policies).
Apple Q&A on Location Data, APPLE PRESS INFO (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html.
Adam Satariano and Katie Hoffmann, Apple Denies Tracking iPhone Locations, Will Update
Software, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0427/apple-denies-tracking-iphone-locations-will-reduce-data-storage-capacity.html.
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users reviewed the advertisers’ information practices, only 1% opted
65
“That’s an opt out rate of just
out of the targeted advertising.
66
0.00002%,” Crovitz notes. “People seem to have adjusted to this new
67
technology faster than regulators are willing to admit.” Crovitz argues that the fact that few consumers read these statements shows
they do not care; in actuality, data already cited strongly suggest that
68
they do not read them because they find them impenetrable.
Another national survey found that 57% of adult Americans were under the false impression that if a Web site merely had a privacy policy,
69
then it would not share their information with other companies.
Moreover, individuals cannot protect themselves from corporations
that employ covert tools such as Flash cookies, supercookies, and
widgets.
Large corporations—which do business in all fifty states, as well as
overseas—find it in their interest to promote regulation that would
provide some modicum of privacy. This is the case because such corporations incur considerable costs when they have to adjust their way
of doing business to different state laws, and deal differently in various segments of the market—some of which are more regulated than
others under the current patchwork of privacy laws.
Hence some large corporations once opposed to legislation now
favor a federal omnibus privacy law that would simplify the patchwork
of federal sector-specific laws and preempt state specific statutes. A
Microsoft white paper from 2005 advised, “[F]ederal privacy legislation should pre-empt state laws that impose requirements for the col70
lection, use, disclosure, and storage of personal information.” Such
a law would likely set standards and ceilings (for instance, caps on
damages for privacy violations), which states could not exceed. State
laws demanding higher privacy standards than a federally mandated
norm would be invalidated, or at least weakened significantly. Indeed, it seems they would accept only legislation that included
65
66
67
68

69

70

Crovitz, supra note 48.
Id.
Id.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for
Consumers, Bussinesses and Policymakers (Dec. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm (“Although many companies use
privacy policies to explain their information practices, the policies have become long, legalistic disclosures that consumers usually don’t read and don’t understand if they do.”).
Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System Is Broken, in ANNENBERG PUBLIC
POLICY CENTER REPORT (2003), available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/
internet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf.
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 921 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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preemption. Former CEO of eBay, Meg Whitman explicitly testified
before Congress, “Legislation without preemption would make the
current situation possibly worse, not better, by creating additional
71
uncertainty and compliance burdens.”
The ideal legislation, for Microsoft and similar entities, would
provide “baseline privacy protection” over which companies would be
encouraged to “compete on the basis of more robust privacy practic72
es” —to essentially regulate themselves. According to Microsoft
Deputy General Counsel Erich Anderson’s testimony before Congress, a federal law should be crafted only as “an effective complement
73
to” self-regulation.
State and sectoral laws have already addressed a number of privacy
issues (e.g. setting limits on tracking consumers for targeted advertis74
75
ing ) while Congress has been largely inactive in this area. Hence,
following a course of self-regulation would in effect reduce privacy
standards in those states that lifted them and may prevent them from
76
adding protections in the future. Moreover, the corporate proposal
does involve some federal legislation rather than merely relying on
self-regulation. Indeed, it seems impossible to restrain the Privacy
Merchants without calling in Big Brother.
C. Consent for Secondary Use: Opt in Rather than Out?
A rather different approach holds that individuals who release information about themselves for a specific purpose or transaction, for
example to purchase a book from Amazon, would be understood to
still “own” this information, and that Amazon could use it for other
purposes (or sell that information to other parties) only with the explicit consent of the consumer (rather than on the basis of a privacy
statement on its Web sites or presumed consent). The same idea is
referred to in other words, namely that consumers would have to opt
in to grant secondary and additional use of private information ra-

71
72

73
74
75
76

Id. at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Need for a Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Consumer Privacy: Hearing on the State of
Online Consumer Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong. 6
(2011) (statement of Erich Anderson, Deputy General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation).
See id. at 5.
Raised B. 5765, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Session. (Conn. 2008).
See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 946 (“In contrast, federal sectoral privacy law presents a
more complicated situation.”).
Hoofnagle, supra note 62.
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77

ther than opt out. In American discourse, the term “owned” is used
because information is treated as property and private information as
private property. In Europe, the same idea is embraced; however,
privacy is treated more as an individual right—as part of the personhood—which is violated when one’s private sphere is violated.
In 1995, in an effort to establish minimum protections for Internet user privacy and establish a baseline consistency among the data
protection laws of European Union (“EU”) member states, the European Council issued what is commonly called the “Data Protection
78
Directive.” The Directive, which scholars have called “aggressive”
79
and “extraordinarily comprehensive,” took effect in October 1998.
Based on a legal tradition that “expressly recognizes the fundamental
80
right to the protection of personal data,” the Directive is credited
with having established the most influential and prominent data pro81
tections in the world to date. However, it has proven difficult to ensure compliance in those countries governed by the Directive. Although the law set out ambitious goals for the standardization of
privacy protection in Europe, it has been hampered from the start by
significant gaps in member states’ compliance and enforcement. According to one observer, “[a]lthough the EU Data Privacy Directive
has been approved by the EU itself, it is not self-implementing. Before taking effect in individual nations, each of the fifteen EU member countries must pass its own implementing legislation. As of the
82
effective date, only five had done so.”
The Directive requires that personal data be processed “only with
83
the consent of the data subject,” with limited exceptions carved out
77

78
79
80

81

82
83

See Julie E. Cohen, Information Rights and Intellectual Freedom, in ETHICS AND THE INTERNET
11, 11–32 (Anton Vedder ed., 2001) (discussing consent-based approaches to privacy and
information “ownership”).
Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,
462 (2000).
FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1997).
Background: EU Data Protection Directive, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://epic.org/privacy/intl/eu_data_protection_directive.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2012).
Erica Newland, CDT Comments on EU Data Protection Directive, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/erica-newland/cdt-comments-eu-dataprotection-directive (calling the Directive “the most influential privacy framework in the
world”); see also Comments of the Center For Democracy and Technology to the European Commission in the Matter of Consultation on the Commission’s Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data
Protection in the European Union, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 7, (2011),
http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_DPD_Comments.pdf (noting the “very strong top-level
principles embodied in the Directive”).
Fromholz, supra note 78, at 467–68.
CATE, supra note 79, at 37.
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for national security, law enforcement, and some basic state functions
84
such as taxation. The intentionally broad language of the Directive
includes—but is not limited to—such actions as collecting, storing,
85
recording, adapting, retrieving, and erasing data; and “data” itself is
defined broadly enough to include not just text, but also photo86
Its restrictions recognize that certain
graphs, video, and sound.
kinds of data are particularly sensitive and vulnerable to abuse; thus,
it contains heightened restrictions on the processing of data which
would reveal the subject’s personal traits, such as race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, or health background. In most cases, collecting and
passing on these kinds of information require the subject’s written
87
consent, or they cannot be processed.
The law also requires a degree of transparency: data processors
must disclose to subjects of processing the ways in which they intend
88
to use the data. Finally, in one of the Directive’s most restrictive and
controversial portions, the drafters attempted to address the “borderless” nature of the Internet and the likelihood that user data could be
processed in or transmitted to countries not subject to the law’s protections. To protect against this vulnerability, the Directive contains a
provision requiring member states to prohibit the transfer of data to
third countries that have not adopted an “adequate level of protec89
tion” for personal data. However as we have seen, implementing
these protections has proven difficult, and enforcement across Europe has, at best, proven inconsistent.
According to a 2011 report from the Center for Democracy and
Technology, “although it is comprehensive in many ways, the [EU]
Data Protection Directive has significant weaknesses. Erratic enforcement and uneven implementation have left consumers and industry confused as to how the Directive’s principles apply to emerg90
ing practices.”
In 2011, various EU authorities called for new,
stronger privacy protection measures, especially in response to Face-

84
85
86
87

88
89
90

See id. (noting that other exemptions allowing for the processing of personal data include
monetary and budgetary considerations for a Member State of the EU or the EU itself).
Id. at 36.
Id.
See id. at 37 (“Personal data may be used only for the legitimate purpose for which they
were collected . . . . The processing of data . . . is severely restricted and in most cases forbidden without the written permission of the data subject.”).
See id. (discussing the requirements of processing personal data in compliance with national laws).
Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80
IOWA L. REV. 431, 437 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Newland, supra note 81.
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book; however, so far those have not been translated into new laws or
regulations, not to mention enforcement.
Limiting the involuntary secondary use of private information is
much more popular in Europe than in the United States, as evidenced by the Directives enacted relatively early in the Internet’s lifespan, while a comprehensive American approach has yet to be articulated. However, the differences between the American and European apapproaches are much less pronounced than they may first seem. This is the
case because: (a) Europeans do allow involuntary secondary use for a
variety of purposes, including national security, prevention of criminal activity, journalistic freedom of speech, and personal use (for in91
stance, an address book); (b) the United States has set limits on a
variety of secondary use of what might be called “sensitive information;” and (c) what is called a “compliance gap”—that is, a gap between what is mandated by European laws and the extent to which
92
the various governments enforce these laws. The EU’s privacy protections suffer from this gap.
The ban on involuntary secondary use burdens the consumers,
who have limited capacity to evaluate various privacy statements and
assurances that these are indeed heeded. They are unaware of the
risks of PVT. And business lobbies tend to strenuously oppose this
approach, which makes it very unlikely to be enacted in the United
States or heeded in Europe. And differences in laws and enforcement levels among countries—across whose borders the same information readily flows—greatly limit the value of this way of better protecting privacy from private invasions.
D. Ban Public Use of Private Information?
Those who adhere to the traditional distinction between the public and private realm, and the precept that the main danger to privacy
comes from Big Brother, may suggest that the way to proceed is to
ban the government from using private databanks. The 1974 Privacy
Act already states that the government may not maintain records of
certain types of personal data for citizens who are not the subjects of
91

92

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42.
See Ellen Mastenbroek, EU Compliance: Still A ‘Black Hole’?, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1103,
1103–20 (2006) (examining potential reasons for and solutions to the compliance gap);
see also Maria Mendrinou, Non-compliance and the European Commission’s Role in Integration,
3 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–22 (1996) (advancing a model of the analysis of the Commission’s approach to non-compliance).
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93

investigations; it would be relatively simple to add that they also may
not use existing records in the private sphere. Still, this would not be
necessary if Privacy Merchants were limited to trading only in less
sensitive information, and of little use if this were not the case. In the
latter case, such a law would in effect assume that it is acceptable for
databanks to be used for profit-making—but not for enhancing the
common good, such as public health and security. Security these
days often brings to mind measures taken to prevent terrorist attacks.
A considerable number of civil liberty advocates hold that these dangers have been exaggerated and hence rights are unduly curtailed.
However, one should note that security also encompasses criminal
94
justice systems, which have utilized databanks to curb criminals.
E. Increased Public Regulation of Sensitive Information?
A limited approach to curbing Privacy Merchants entails expanding the American patchwork of sectoral laws that limit the violation of
privacy in one specific area or another. As Gina Stevens catalogues,
“[f]ederal laws and regulations extend protection to consumer credit
reports, electronic communications, federal agency records, education records, bank records, cable subscriber information, video rental
records, motor vehicle records, health information, telecommunications subscriber information, children’s online information, and cus95
tomer financial information.” One could add some more areas to
this long but seemingly arbitrary list.
The patchwork of laws can be viewed as based on a rationale that
treats differently three main areas—private information gleaned from
public records (e.g. house ownership), relatively sensitive information (especially medical and financial), and information that is in effect deemed less sensitive (most consumer choices). The patchwork
can be seen as largely based on the level of sensitivity of the information. Public records, therefore, are open for dissemination online
because this information was not private in the first place; less sensi93

94

95

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2006) (“Each agency that maintains a system of records
shall . . . maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about
whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.”).
See Amitai Etzioni, DNA Tests and Databases in Criminal Justice: Individual Rights and the
Common Good, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 197, 197 (David Lazer ed., 2004)
(discussing “several issues raised by the extensive use of DNA tests and databases in advancing public safety”).
GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL
INFORMATION ONLINE 7 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
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tive information is considered in need of little protection because no
or little harm is inflicted when it is used by third parties; and sensitive
information is protected. And to the extent that one finds that some
area is not well protected, the argument runs, one can add another
“patch” of legislation to cover this area.
The patchwork approach has two serious defects, one often cited
and one less often noted. It is widely recognized that the patchwork
lags woefully behind technological developments in the private sector. Thus, legislation attempting to cover uncovered areas is “proposed” and “drafted” but not enacted. As of mid-2011, one suggested
bill calls for a federal requirement of a “Do Not Track” option for on96
line advertising. Another suggested bill would deal with the relative97
ly new technology of geolocation and mobile privacy. The Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) is reportedly working on a regulatory
framework governing social networking sites, in the wake of high98
profile FTC complaints against Google Buzz and Twitter. The FTC
also plans to target smart phones, a market virtually untouched by
99
regulation thus far. However, these laws lag considerably behind
the new technological developments employed by Privacy Merchants,
and given the current anti-regulatory climate, are unlikely to be
enacted.
Less often noted is the problem that the distinction between “sensitive” and “less sensitive” information is much less tight than it seems
and is likely to further weaken in the near future. Even if sensitive information such as medical or financial records is better protected online, less sensitive—and therefore, less protected—information can
reveal volumes of sensitive information through PVT. As Marcy Peek
points out, “the Internet has allowed commercial decision-makers to
manipulate technology in such a way as to identify persons according
100
to a multitude of variables and categories.”
Unique IP addresses
are tracked by each page people visit and ad they click on to create a
96

97
98

99
100

See Katie Kindelan, John McCain and John Kerry Propose “Online Privacy Bill of Rights,” SOCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011, 5:12 PM), http://socialtimes.com/john-mccain-and-john-kerrypropose-online-privacy-bill-of-rights_b41604 (discussing proposed legislation that would
govern online privacy).
Id.
Tony Romm, Will FTC Get the Funds It Needs to Police Internet?, POLITICO (June 3, 2011, 4:36
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56134.html (discussing the implications of congressional allotment of funds to the FTC on the FTC’s potential to expand its
regulatory powers).
Id.
Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage and Counterespionage in the Internet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 94 (2003) (evaluating ways to resist discriminatory marketing
in cyberspace).
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detailed portrait of the offline persona. Peek explains, “[t]hrough
various means such as ‘cookies,’ Web bugs, and personal data input
such as zip codes, corporate marketers can obtain a person’s demographic and other information and ‘tag’ an individual on the basis of
101
such information.” The individual is then categorized and ranked
against other users. The result is “Weblining,” an online version of
the offline discriminatory practice of “redlining” individuals by deny102
ing or increasing the cost of services based on their demographic.
After the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited redlining, which used a
mortgage applicant’s neighborhood to discriminate along racial
lines, banks instead used other markers of race as a basis for racial
discriminations; for instance, which social club people joined or
103
church they attended.
That is, an item of information that is not
sensitive was used to divine another item meant to be private. The
easy access to this type of non-sensitive information online streamlines this practice.
As early as 2000, Business Week highlighted a PVT service offered
by data broker company Acxiom called “InfoBase Ethnicity System,”
which matched names against housing, education, and incomes in
order to identify the unpublicized ethnicity of an individual or
104
group.
More recently, a computer consultant named Tom Owad
wrote a simple piece of software allowing him to download public
wish lists that Amazon.com customers post to catalog products they
105
plan to buy.
He downloaded over 250,000 wish lists in one day,
used Yahoo People Search to identify addresses and phone numbers,
and published a detailed map showing the locations of people interested in certain books or themes. Owad explained, “It used to
be . . . you had to get a warrant to monitor a person or a group of
people. Today, it is increasingly easy to monitor ideas. And then
106
track them back to people.” And most people who put simple items
of information about their preferences on their Facebook profiles are

101
102
103
104

105

106

Id. at 95.
Id. at 91–92 n.4.
See id. (explaining the practice and history of redlining).
Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, http://www.businessweek.com/2000/
00_14/b3675027.htm (assessing companies’ practices of using personal data to take advantage of customers online).
Nicholas Carr, Tracking Is an Assault on Liberty, With Real Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7–8,
2010, at W1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (arguing for the need for greater privacy
protection online).
Id.
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unlikely to know that it can be used to divine their personality traits
107
with 90% accuracy, as if they had taken personality tests.
All this suggests that laws that ban the use of sensitive information
(without requiring any action by the millions of affected citizens), the
way medical, financial, and select other records are now protected,
108
could be reinforced by banning PVT of protected areas.
That is,
the wall that separates more sensitive and less sensitive information
could be shored up. (Granted, the debate about what is sensitive and
what is not would continue.) That is, the law would ban Privacy Merchants from using information on what one purchases (and other
such “less” sensitive information) to divine one’s medical condition
(and other such “more” sensitive information).
Given the current pro-business and anti-regulatory climate in
Congress, the Supreme Court, and, it seems, among the voters,
enactment of such laws in the United States (and their enforcement
in Europe, if enacted) may seem very unlikely. The prospect of such
legislation improves if one notes that they would mainly curb those
few corporations that make selling private information their main
lines of business. Other corporations that merely keep profiles of
their own customers’ consumeristic preferences would not be affected,
although their ability to sell this information to other parties might
be limited (to reduce the risk of PVT), and their advertising would be
set back because corporations could not use sensitive information in
their targeting. Nevertheless, if such laws against PVT used to divine
sensitive information could be enacted, they would serve as part of a
system that would shore up privacy to a reasonable level in the future,
in which I expected PVT otherwise to be much extended. It is better
to ban this approach before it catches on widely than try to eradicate
it once it is widespread.
CONCLUSION
Corporations, especially those that make trading in private information their main line of business—the Privacy Merchants—are major violators of privacy, and their reach is rapidly expanding. Given
that the information these corporations amass and process is also

107

108

Jennifer Golbeck, Cristina Robles & Karen Turner, Predicting Personality with Social Media,
CHI 2011, at 253-54 (discussing a study conducted to determine to what extent information on an individual’s Facebook page can accurately reflect the individual’s personality).
The EU, China, and India have all begun to take steps that would give individuals more
control over the data collected by companies. See Private Data, Public Rules, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 28, 2012, at 59, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543489.
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available to the government, it is no longer possible to protect privacy
by only curbing the State. Suggesting that norms have changed and
that people are now more willing to give up their privacy may be true,
but only up to a point. The extent to which private aspects of one’s
medical and even financial conditions are revealed is unlikely to be
widely accepted as a social good. And violation of the privacy of dissenters and, more generally, of one’s political and social views (e.g.,
by tracking what people read) has chilling effects, whether or not the
majority of the public understands the looming implications of unbounded profiling of most Americans. Self-regulation cannot come
to the rescue because it assumes that individuals can sort out what
corporations are doing behind the veil of their privacy statements, an
unrealistic assumption. Banning the use of less sensitive information
(in particular, about purchases) for divining more sensitive information (e.g., medical)—that is, outlawing Privacy Violating Triangulation—may serve, if combined with laws that add “patches” to the current patchwork of legislation, to cover new technological
developments (e.g., social media). If such twin progress is possible,
there will be much less reason to prevent the government from drawing on the databanks maintained by Privacy Merchants, because they
would be limited to less sensitive information, and PVT of innocent
Americans would be banned. Without such progress, one must assume that what is private is also public in two senses of these words:
that one’s privacy (including sensitive matters) is rapidly corroded by
the private sector and that whatever it learns is also available to the
government.

